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I.
According to Odgers oil Libel and Slander, *53 (BI. ed.
3j887), spoken words are actionable: x, Where the words
.charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime; 2,
When they impute to him a contagious or infectious disease,
tending to exclude him from society; 3, When they are
spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade
(or business, as others state the rule, that being a more com-
prehensive word than trade); 4, When, although notf er'se
actionable, they have caused some special damage to the
plaintiff. This classification, however, seems to be faulty,
in that it apparently classes words affecting a man in his
profession or business with those pier se actionable on
account of their defamatory character; whereas the former
become actionable only by reason of the person in reference
to whom they are spoken, and should therefore be classed
with those words which are actionable only by reason of
special damage, the fact that a person is in trade, as was
said by WILLIAMS, J., in Rolin v. Slewarl (1854), 14 C. B.
603, standing in the place of special damage. Newell on
Defamation, Slander, and Libel (i89o), extends (page 84)
the list of words actionable tier se to those which impute
moral turpitude, or a want of chastity and the like. Town-
shend, in the fourth edition of his work on Slander and
Libel (page I57, &c.,) adopts a more intricate classification,
but one that in the main agrees with that of Newell.
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Do words imputing insanity fall under any of these heads?
The causes of insanity are so numerous, that although it
may be caused by criminal excesses, the presumption is that
it is not so caused, and therefore the imputation of it does
not imply any idea of criminality or turpitude ol the part
of the one to whom it is imputed, unless there be words
added which would necessarily imply that such was the case.
And while insanity is a disease, or at least has been so held
for certain purposes (see McCullough v. Ext ressman's Ass'n7,
189o, 133 Pa. 142 and cases cited), yet it is .not a disease the
imputation of which is considered per se defamatory. As
HOAR, J., said in Joannes v. -Rurt (T863), 6 Allen (Mass.)
236 :
An action for oral slander, in charging the plaintiff with disease, has
been confined to the imputation of such loathsome and infectious maladies
as would make hin, an object of disgust and aversion, and banish him
from human society. We believe the only examples which adjudged.
cases furnish are of the plague, leprosy and venereal disorders.
It is clear, then, that spoken words imputing insanity are
not actionable per se, and that therefore they cannot be the
basis of an action unless it clearly appear that they caused
some special damage to the plaintiff, or that they were
spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or busi-
ness, in which case they would doubtless be held actionable,
if their natural tendency was to cause him pecuniary loss.
But this tendency to cause loss cannot be a merely possible
one. It munst be either the necessary r sult of the words
spoken, or their actual result, either natural or proximate:
Townshend, Slander and. Libel, page 224, n, citing Foulger
v. Newcomb (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 327. Is it the necessary or
the natural tendency of an oral imputation of insanity to
cause pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, even if spoken of him
in the way of his profession or business? Words and
phrases which impute insanity or mental disease are so
loosely used in common conversation, and the habit of
exaggeration is so prevalent, that but little attention is paid
to them. Such expressions as " he is wild," "he is not
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right," "lhe is cracked," "lie is crazy," and the like, are
frequently used even in reference to friends and relations;
and they really mean no more than that the individual re-
ferred to does not agree with the speaker's ideas or preju-
dices, although their strict and literal signification is that
the person mentioned is mentally diseased or affected. This
loose use of language is so well known, that almost no one
understands these expressions literally (unless, perhaps, when
they are spoken by a physician, whose profession gives his
words an additional weight in this case), so that they rarely
injure anyone, even in his business. And if this is so, what
injury can be reasonably apprehended from the use of such
expressions? All imputations which may affect a man in
his profession or business are not actionable. It has been
held that it is not libellous to publish of a lawyer that lie is
a "crank ": Walker v. Tribne CO. (1887), U. S. C. Ct. N.
D. Ill., 29 Fed. Repr. 827, and it may be observed, that in
common parlance the term "crank" has, as was urged by
the plaintiff in the case just cited, a tolerably well-defined
and somewhat opprobrious meaning, and one that is similar
to that of the expressions previously mentioned.
The text books, as a nile, state in general terms that an
imputation of insanity is actionable, without making any
distinction between oral and written imputations; but cite,
as authority, cases of the written imputation thereof
Townshend, however, states on page 200, under the head of
the imputation of disease, that it is not actionable to charge
one with being insane, unless it affects him in his business,
and cites the case of Joannes v. Part, supra. But the
authorities hardly bear out even this qualification of the
principle. In Mfayrant v. Richardson (ISIS), I Nott and
McCord (S. C.) 347, where the defendant had said of the
plaintiff, who was a candidate for election to Congress, " He
(meaning William Mayrnt) is impaired in his understand-
ing; his mind is impaired; his mind is injured by disease ;
that Doctor Irvine told him so ; that Doctor Irvine said his
mind was impaired, weakened, and could never be depended
on," it was held, in spite of plaintiff's claimi that this slander
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caused him to lose the election, that the words were not
actionable, the Court, per Nor'r, J., saying:
The words in this case * * barely express an opinion that the plain-
tiff's mind had been impaired by disease. That was a misfortune and
not a fault. It might have been calculated to excite compassion, but not
hatred, ridicule or contempt. * * It is not pretended that these words,
spoken of a private individual, would have been actionable. And I am
not aware of any principle of Law or Constitution, by which a person by
proclaiming himself a candidate for Congress, becomes so far elevated
above the common level of mankind, as to entitle him to any exclusive
privileges. * * The defendant might not have been able to prove, that
the plaintiff's mind had been impaired by disease, or that he was not
qualified to fill the important station for which he offered his services,
yet it might have been his opinion. He might have been actuated bythe
utmost malice, but it may have been his opinion still. It is a question
not susceptible of proof. The Constitution has fixed no grade of Mind
which is necessary to qualify a person for a seat in Congress ; neither
have we any intellectual scale by which to measure the understanding. It
is a question on which a man may differ in opinion from all the rest of.
the world; on which lie has a right to differ from them all and to express
his opinion. * * Even when special damage is the foundation of the
action, the words must be of an opprobrious nature, and such as are cal-
culated to lessen the person of whom they are spoken, in the opinion of
the community. But where they are perfectly justifiable or innocent, no
action will lie, although some injury may have resulted from them. As
to say of a Lawyer, that lie was not wiltv, by which lie lost a fee; of a
Clergyman, that lie was not eloquent, by which he failed to get a place,
or of a IVoman, that she was not handsome, by which she lost her mar-
riage; all these are mere matters of opinion, which furnish no standard'
by which the truth can be determined, and of which every person has a
right to judge for himself; and such I have shown the words in the prin-
cipal case to be. The private character has not been attacked, the moral
conduct impeached, nor the sanctuary of domestic tranquillity violated.
There has been no imputation calculated to render the plaintiff an objedt
of contempt or ridicule, or to lessen him in the estimation of his fellow-
citizens.
In Joa1;ins v. Bzut, supira, it was held by Judge HOAR
that an oral imputation of insanity w-as not actionable with-
out an averment of special damage. So, also, in Weldon v.
De Ba/le (1885), 33 W. R. 3 28, where it was alleged that
the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of
the plaintiff, a married woman, certain words to the effect
that he had seen the plaintiff, and that from what lie had
seen and heard he thought it his duty to urge the plaintifPs
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husband to send for one or two doctors to see her, and that
some opinion should be taken as to the state of her mind,
a similar rule was laid down by BiTrM, M. R., in these words:
As to the slander, it seems to me to be perfectly clear that the plaintiff
cannot maintain the action, even if the words were spoken as alleged.
The law is perfectly plain and has long been settled that, in respect of
slanderous words such as these in question, however distasteful they may
be to a plaintiff, an action will not lie unless they have produced that which
the law recognizes as special damage. To constitute such damage it is
necessary to prove something more than injury to the plaintiff's feelings,
because that is not a legal cause; though, by way of damage, where there
is a cause of action, the law does take notice of such injury. There-
fore slander causing mere injury to feelings isno cause of action. Another
rule is that the special damage must be the natural and reasonable result
of the words spoken.
In Wildee v. McKee (I885), 1ii Pa. 335, an action on
the case for conspiracy to defame, the plaintiff alleged that
he was engaged in the business of a teacher; that the de-
fendants formed a conspiracy to defame him, and that the
said defendants "falsely and maliciously spoke and published
of and concerning the said plaintiff, and of and concerning
him in his said business and profession, * * the false,
scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following, that
is to say, 'The mau (meaning the said plaintiff) must not be
right in his mind, thereby meaning that the said plaintiff
was incapacitated for his said business and profession on
account of insanity and monomania on the subject of adul-
tery and whoredom."' To this statement the defendants
demurred, and the Court below sustained the demurrer.
This ruling was reversed, however, in the Supreme Court,
in an opinion by STERRETT, J., which, after reciting the
allegations of the plaintiff, proceeds as follows:
Coupled, as this count [the one partly recited above] is, with the re-
citals and averments by which it is preceded, and followed by an aver-
ment of special damages, we cannot, in view of the authorities above re-.
ferred to, say the charge therein contained is not actionable. We have
no right to indulge in any speculation as to the answer the defendants
may make to the charges contained in the declaration. They elected by
their demurrer to take the position that the recitals and charges contained
in the declaration, assuming them to be true, are insufficient to warrant
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a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff. In this they were sustained,
erroneously as we think, by the court below.
It is clear from this that the sufficiency of the declaration
did not rest upon the defamatory character of the imputa-
tion of insanity alleged.
From these authorities, which are all that the books con-
tain on this branch of the subject, it follows, as was previ-
ously contended on general principles, that an oral imputa-
tion of insanity is not so opprobrious and injurious to repu-
tation, or an imputation of such a disease, as is fier se de-
famatory in the eye of the law; that on the contrary, it
tends to awaken a generous sympathy for the sufferer in the
hearts of his fellow men; that it is a mere matter of indi-
vidual opinion, on which every person has a right to express
himself in good faith, and that, therefore, it is not action-
able, unless special damage can be averred and proved.
This special damage, moreover, must be actual pecuniary
loss, and be the natural result of the imputation; or be
inferred from the fact that the plaintiff is engaged in a pro-
fession or business where injury would naturally and neces-
sarily result to him from such an imputation. Mfayrant v.
-Richardson (sirra, page 391,) would seem to hold that such
an imputation can never be actionable, without the proof or
necessary inference of actual malice; but that would scarcely
be maintainable to-day.
The true rule, stated briefly, is as follows: An oral impu-
tation of insanity is not actionable, unless it be the cause of
special damage, or directly affect the plaintiff in his profes-
sion, office, or business.
II.
Is the imputation of insanity libelous, when written or
printed? This is a more doubtful question. Many impu-
tations are actionable when written, which are not so when
spoken, and it is very difficult to lay down any general rule
in regard to these cases. Most of them, doubtless, proceed
upon the assumption that written imputations are supposed
to be made after due reflection, and therefore carry more
0
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weight to the mind of the reader than spoken imputations
to the hearer; receive more attention and consideration, and
are more likely to injure the person to whom they refer.
But if, .as has been shown to be the rule in oral imputations
of insanity, the spoken imputation is notpier se opprobrious,
defamatory or injurious, can the mere fact of writing or
printing it make it so ? The text books hold, with great
unanimity, that it does; in other words, that the written
imputation of insanity is per se libellous: Odgers, Libel
and Slander, page *21 (B1. ed. 1887); Townshend, Slander and
Libel, pages 209 and 241 (4th ed. 189o). The cases, how-
ever, hardly bear out this bald statement, as a critical exam-
ination will show. In none of them has the mere imputa-
tion of insanity been before the court, but there have been
additional circumstances which no doubt had a large influ-
ence in molding the decision.
In the earliest English case, that of Rexv v. Harvey (1823),
2 B. & C. 257, the defendants had published a newspaper ar-
ticle headed "Latest Intelligence-The King," and begin-
fning: "Attached as we sincerely and lawfully are to every
interest connected with the sovereign, or any of his illus-
trious relatives, it is with the deepest concern we have to
state, that the malady under which his majesty labours is of
an alarming description. It is from authority we speak."
It concluded by alleging that his disorder was of an heredi-
tary description. No question as to the libellous nature of
the imputation was raised, it being conceded, as appears from
the opinion of BAvREY, J., " that to state falsely of his
majesty that which is stated in this publication is a libel."
But the case is sui generis, and of but little authority, for
not only does "tthe divinity that doth hedge a king" afford
ample reason for holding the publication libellous, but it
also totally fails, in other cases, to extend its acgis over pri-
vate individuals, and there is no good reason whvy it should
in this instance.
The case of lforgan v. Lingen (1863), 8 L. T. N. S. 8oo,
before Baron MARTIN, at nisi irius, upon which the rule
laid down in the text books appears to be based, was founded
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upon an imputation of insanity, cast upon a private indi-
vidual. There were two counts, one for oral, the other for
written, defamation. It was proved that the defendant had
sent a letter to a connection of the plaintiff, stating that he
had no doubt that the plaintiff's mind was affected, and that
seriously, and that lie had known that she believed more
than half a dozen people to be hostile to her, and that she
had the delusion that, in several instances, his wife had stood
in her way. It was also proved that he had made prac-
tically the same statements orally. The plaintiff was a gov-
erness. In charging the jury, Baron MARTIN said that in
respect to the oral slander, he did not think special damage
sufficiently proved-a dicum which corresponds with what
has previously been stated to be the rule. In reference to
the written imputation, he said:
A statement in writing that a lady's mind is affected, and that seriously,
is, without explanation, prima facie a libel.
It is worth noting that the rule is not here laid down i
the bald language of the text books, but with a qualifica-
tion. What do these words "without explanation" mean
in this connection? They cannot mean that the letter
might be shown to be a privileged communication, for that
phase of the case is discussed separately. They must mean
an explanation of the causes and circumstances which led
to the writing of the letter-presumably the proof of reason-
able and probable cause to believe the plaintiff insane; or
an opinion, not merely baseless, but with some foundation
of fact, that the mind of the plaintiff was affected; such an
opinion, in short, as was referred to in the passage quoted
from Mayrant v. Richardson (suira, page 392).
The defendant might not have been able to prove, that the plaintiff's
mind had been impaired by disease, v * * yet it might have been his
opinion-
Not only, then, does this case fail to support the broad
statement, for which it is cited as authority, that a written
imputation of insanity is libellous, but the additional ele-
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ment is present, that the plaintiff was a governess, and that.
the imputation was calculated to affect her in her profession.
And it may be worth while to note that the jury found for
the defendant
In Weldon v. Winslow, London Times, March x4-I9,
1884, the plaintiff, a married woman, brought suit against
the defendant, a physician, and at the time the keeper of a
private lunatic asylum, for damages for libel, assault and
false imprisonment. The libel alleged was that the defend-
ant had -written to the plaintiff's husband:
I have been to Tavistock House this morning, and have seen Mrs. Wet-
don. I think it my duty to inform you it is imperative that immediate-
steps to secure her, should be taken.
It may be proper to mention, however, that, in the letter
read on the trial, these words do not occnr, the apparently-
libellous part of the letter being:
Her manner, general conversation and demeanor were those of an in-
sane person, and I am decidedly of opinion that her condition is such as
to require the immediate protection of her friends.
This charge of libel also rested upon the fact that Dr.
Winslow had writtdi to the editor of the BriH s Mfedima
Journal as follows :
I maintain, therefore, that I have convinced your readers that the proper
course was advised in the case of Mrs. Weldon, and that, with the de-
scription of the interview, I was perfectly justified in my action. I also.
emphatically add, that all who have had any experience in mental dis-
orders would have advised a similar course.
In pursuance of the aforesaid letter to her husband, an
order was obtained under the Lunacy Acts, signed by Sir
Henry De Bathe (against whom also an action was brought
by Mrs. Weldon, which failed. See Weldon v. De Bathe,
sufira, page 392), and as to the regularity of which there
seems to have been no question. It was intended to take
Mrs. Weldon to the defendant's private asylum tnder the
order, and the assault complained of was committed by the
defendant's servants in pursuance thereof. She really was
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not taken from her house at all, but, as she said, had been
put under duress in it for some hours before escaping from
it. On the part of the defendant, it was proved that the
article in the British fedical Journal was in answer to
another that had appeared in it a week before, in which Dr.
Winslow had been distinctly challenged to justify his action.
The case was tried at nzisijrius before Baron HUDDLESTON,
who held both publications privileged, saying that he had
had grave doubts at first as to the character of the second;
-but as Mrs. Weldon had, previous to its publication, pub-
lished several articles in various periodicals giving her views
,of the matter, he now considered it privileged, as well as the
first. He held, also, that there was no case to go to the
jury, saying:
Mr. Weldon had no doubt felt himself honestly bound to have an opin-
ion taken as to her mental condition, and the medical men whom he had
-employed had come to an honest conclusion, but, as he [the judge]
thought, a mistaken one, that she had hot then been in full possession of
her senses. With every inclination not to take a technical view of the
case, he was bound to hold that there was no case to go to the jury. The
libels complained of had been both written on occasions which were privi-
leged, and lie ought to take it upon himself to say that there was no rea-
sonable evidence of malice on the part of the defendant. None of the
-statements made by him had been untrue, or untrue, at any rate, to his
knowledge.
The gist of this decision manifestly is that while such an
imputation, made under such circumstances by a physician,
is prima fade libellous (which may be tacitly assumed,
though not expressly stated), presumably because of the pro-
fessional character of such a defendant, and the serious con-
sequences which naturally result from such an opinion, es-
pecially in a case of this kind; yet if made bona fide, in a
proper way, and to an interested person, or in other words,
strictly as a professional opinion when properly called for, it
will be privileged, as it then falls clearly within the defini-
tion of a privileged communication: Odgers, *204, &c;
Townshend, 300, 301. Odgers cites this case as authority for
the statement that "it is libellous for the manager of a pri-
vate lunatic asylum to write of a lady, 'I have been to her
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house this morning and seen her. I think it my duty to in-
form you it is imperative that immediate steps to secure her
should be taken' (page *2 1); but this is nowhere expressly
stated in the report of the case, and this communication was
the one as to the privileged character of which the judge had
no doubts. The statement may be true on general princi-
ples, owing to the peculiar professional character of the
manager of a lunatic asylum, the influence such an imputa-
tion coming from him would naturally have, and the conse-
quences that might naturally be expected to follow; but
this case is no direct authority for it.
The question of the libellous character of an imputation of
insanity came before the Court collaterally in Cave v. Torre
(i886), 54 L. T. N. S. 515, au action for damages for false
imprisonment and libel. The libel complained of was a
statement made by the defendant that time plaintiff was of
unsound mind. This statement was contained in an order,
signed by the defendant, for the removal of the plaintiff to a
lunatic asylum ; and the false imprisonment alleged related
to the same matter. Although not time point directly in
question, the matter of libel was touched in the opinion of
Lord ESIIER, M. R., who said:
The plaintiff complains that the defendant published a libel which con-
sisted in saying that the plaintiff was a lunatic. Whether a jury in the
end will say that, even if it is true, it is a libel or not, I cannot express
any opinion. Whether it is a libel to say that a person is a lunatic I will
not undertake to say. That is for a jury.
This at least shows that he was not prepared to hold, as
Baron MARTIN had done in Mforgan v. Lingen (siepra, page
395), that such an imputation was prima facie libellous; and
his real views may perhaps be inferred from this later passage
of his opinion, "his own foolish addition about time thing
being a libel, which is utterly ridiculous." It may be as-
sumed, also, upon the authority of WPeldon v. Winslow
(supra, page 397), that if the question had been raised, the
statement complained of would have been held privileged.
So much for the English cases. The earliest American
case upon this point, even antedating Rex v. Harvey, is
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Southwick v. Stevens (1813), io Jofns. (N. Y.) 443. Both
parties to the action were newspaper men; and a war of
words, which, unhappily for the defendant, seems to have
been begun in his paper, was carried on between them for
some time, until it culminated in the following article, which
was the libel complained of:
It is with unfeigned grief we inform our readers, that Southwick, the
late editor of the Albany Register, has become insane; the progress of
his malady has been observed for some time past; and, at length, much
to theregret of his friends, and his adversaries, it has resulted in a con-
firmed lunacy. The friends of the unfortunate, w.e understand, have con-
fined him to his former editorial closet, and have consigned the manage-
ment of his paper to a needy Irishman who wears straw in his shoes. Al-
though this deplorable event has been expected by many for some time,
yet decisive evidence of the disease having arrived at its last stage did not
exist until the twenty-fourth instant, when the Albany Registerexhibited
such unequivocal proofs of the insanity of its editor, that the friends and
creditors of the establishment, we are told, shut up the poor maniac, put
him in a straightjacket, shaved his head, and confined him to bread and
water.
It needs no argument to show that this publication is
libelous; but then it is a good deal more than a bare impu-
tation of insanity. Its whole purpose and tendency was, as
the Judge below charged, to hold up the plaintiff in a
ridiculous point of light, and in that view it was libelous.
It was written, however, in answer to an article published in
the Albany Register of the twenty-fourth of the same
month, which was calculated to cause great provocation;
and the Judge intimated that if the tone of this article had
been less censorious and ridiculing, or if, as was not the case,
the article in the Albany Register had been the first aggres-
sive.movement, he might have held this article privileged.
This would have accorded with the decision in Weldon .
Winslow (supr-a, page 397), and with the rule laid down by
Odgers, *232, and Townshend, 393, n.
In Mayrant v. Richardson (sztra, page 391), there was,
beside the count for oral slander, a second count for libel
contained in a letter; but the Court treats both together, and
the language of the opinion must be taken as applying to
either count indifferently. In this ccnnection, however, it
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may be noted, that in that case the idea of privilege was
manifestly present in the mind of the Judge, as will appear
from this passage of the opinion:
When one becomes a candidate for public honors, he makesprofer of
himself for public investigation. All his pretensions become proper sub-
jects of enquiry and discussion. He makes himself a species of public
properly, into the qualities of which every one has a right to enquire, and
of the fitness of which, every one has a right to judge and give his opin-
ions. The ordeal of public scrutiny, is, many times, a disagreeable and
painful operation. But it is the result of that freedom of speech, which is
the necessary attribute of every free government, and is expressly guar-
anteed to the people of this country by the Constitution ": I Nott and
McCord (S. C.) 350.
In Perkins v. Mitchell (186o), 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 461, the
defendant was a physician; and the" alleged libel was as fol-
lows:
CITY Ov BROOKLYN,
COUNTY Olt KINGS. SS.
We, Chauncey L. Mitchell, M. D., and William H. Dudley, M. D., of
the City of Brooklyn, in said County, physicians, duly licensed to prac-
tice as such, according to the laws of the State of New York, do certify
that we have, examined into and are acquainted with the state of health
and mental condition ofJoseph Perkins of the City of Brooklyn, in said
County, and that he is, in our opinion, insane, and a fit person to be sent
to the lunatic asylum.
Dated Dec. 4, 1858.
(Signed) CHAUNCEY L. Mi[TCHELL, M. D.
W,'ILLIAMa H. DUDLEY, M. D.
COUNTY Olt KINGS, SS.
Chauncey L. Mitchell. of the City of Brooklyn, in said County, being
duly sworn, says, that he is acquainted with Joseph Perkins, of said City,
and that he is disordered in his senses, and has been so for some time
past; and that lie is, in this deponent's best judglnent and belief, so dis-
ordered in his senses as to endanger the persons of other people, if left
unrestrained, and that it is dangerous to permit him longer to go at large.
(Signed) CHAUNCEY I. TITCHFELL. M. D.
Sworn before me this 4th day of December, 1859.
F. Q. DALTON,
A. G. HAMAIOND,
Justices of the Peace, Kings County.
It was alleged that, in consequence of this affidavit, the
plaintiff was taken to a lunatic asylum, and detained there
VOL. XXX-26
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for four days. The defendant demurred, a perilous proceed-
ing in such a case, and the demurrer was overruled. This
action of the lower Court was sustained in the Supreme
Court in a lengthy opinion by Judge EmoTT, in the course
of which he said:
It is clearly libelous to publish of another that he is " insane and a fit
person to be sent to the lunatic asylum;" or that "he is so dis-
ordered in his senses as to endanger the persons of other people, if left
unrestrained, and that it is dangerous to permit him longer to go at
large." There is no definition of libel which has ever been received by
the courts which will not include such a charge. It is a censorious and
ridiculing writing, and if untrue, it will ordinarily be inferred to have
been made with a mischievous and malicious intent towards the indi-
vidual named; which are the conditions of General Hamilton's celebrated
definition in the Croswell Case(1804,3Johns. Cas. 337,354; 1812, 9Johns.
215). It sets the plaintiff in an odious light, and exposes him to public
contempt and aversion, which is Blackstone's rule (3 Conim. 125 ; 4 Id.
rso).
This is undoubtedly true of the publication in this case.
No doubt- can exist but that an imputation that a man is a
dangerous lunatic, holds him up in an odious light, and is
calculated to seriously injure his business and reputation;
for most people are inclined to give a dangerous lunatic a
wide berth. But such an imputation is clearly very differ-
ent from a mere imputation of insanity in general, without
any such addition. The language of the Court, then, can-
not be properly applied to such a case. And, besides,
special damage was present in the shape of false imprison-
ment, and the person who made the imputation was a physi-
cian. The Court fully recognized the principle previously
contended for, that such an imputation is more serious when
coming from a physician, in the following passage:
Nor is the libelous character of the language destroyed, or diminished,
by the fact that the defendant is a physician, and makes the statement as
a professional opinion. It is rather an aggravation of such a charge that
it is backed by the professional skill and authorityofa medical man. Can
it be doubted that if a physician shoull, witbout cause or justification,
wantonly write and publish a statement that a man was insane, dangerous
and unfit to be at large, and that such was his opinion as a medical man,
he would be liable to an action for libel?
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In regard to the question of privilege, which came up in
two aspects, one general, the other based upon the fact that
the affidavits cornplained of as libelous were made in the
course of a regular judicial proceeding under the New York
Lunacy Acts, the general rule, conformably to that laid
down in the text books, was stated to be, that "to give to a
statement made by a physician, which would otherwise be
criminatory and libelous, a privileged character, lie must
not only utter it as a medical man, but it must be made in
the discharge of a duty, and to a person who has or is en-
gaged in a corresponding duty in reference to the subject
matter."
Upon time second aspect of the question the Court held as
follows:
It is not, in nivjudginent, libelous or actionable as such, for a physician
to furnish evidence, either voluntary or under a subpoena, that another is
insane, in a proceeding duly taken under any of the clauses of this statute.
* * *No action of libel can be maintained for an assertion of the in-
sanity of the plaintiff, contained in an affidavit made in a procecding
properly and legally instituted under this statute.
This, it will be observed, is in full accord with the ruling
in Weldon v. !finsl/ow (sti-ra, page 397). In the present
case, however, the complaint, which, as the Judge observed,
"must state all the facts which the defendant would be
obliged to plead in setting up his privilege, in order to show
that the plaintiff has no cause of action ill the publication of
a charge which in itself is clearly libelous," failed, in the
opinion of the Court, and as a skilfil pleader would certainly
make it fail, to set forth the facts which would make it
privileged, and the order overruling the demurrer was stis-
tained. But had it been the case that the facts were fiuly
before the Court, there can be no doubt that the alleged
libel, as in I[ehldon v. TT ins/o', would have been held privi-
leged.
In .C7li;d v. (och;'ane (1882) TO Ill. App. 570, the
plaintiff had received an appointment s architect of the
San Francisco City Hall, and, it seems. had referred to the
defendant for testimony as to his qualifications. The alleged
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libel was contained in an interview with the defendant,
published in the Chicago Times and copied in one of the
San Francisco papers, in which the defendant was repre-
sented as saying, inter alia, and repeating the same, or
closely similar statements, even after lie had been informed
of the reference to him by the plaintiff, "I think he is crazy.
Had it happened [i e., Clifford's appointment] I should re-
gard it in the light of a public calamity," and "I again say
that I cannot regard it in any other light than a public
calamity." The plaintiff alleged that in consequence of the
republication of the article in the San Francisco Chronie,
his bondsmen withdrew as sureties on his bond, and being
unable to procure others, he was forced to, and did, resign
his position as architect of the building in question. The
Court laid down the general rule as to words affecting one in
a particular calling, as follows:
Any words spoken of such a person in his office, trade, profession, or
business, which tend to impair his credit, or charge him with fraud, or in-
direct dealings, or with intcapacity, and that tend to injure him in his
trade, profession, or business, are actionable, without proof of special
damage.
In regard to the words in the present case it was held:
To say of the plaintiff, "The poor fellow is crazy," and that his appoint-
ment could be regarded in no other light than a public calamity, with
other similarstatements made and repeated after the defendant had been
notified that the plaintiff had referred to him as to his qualifications as an
architect, was, if the words were untrue, a grievous slander, which would
naturally and almost necessarily tend to the plaintiffs injury. It was
tantamount to a direct and positive assertion that the plaintiff was desti-
tute of the necessary qualifications for the proper discharge of the duties
of an architect.
In this case, it will be seen, there were several additional
circumstances to aggravate the general imputation of insan-
ity. The libel complained of was plainly of the plaintiff in
his profession; words were used, which, far more clearly
than the imputation of insanity, conveyed the idea that he
was unfit to perform the duties of the position to which he
had been chosen; and these charges were aggravated by the
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fact that they were reasserted after the defendant had been
notified that the plaintiff had referred to him as to his quali-
fications, a fact which would naturally tend to prove malice
on the part of any defendant, if his assertions be untrue.
In Moore v. Francis (1888), 3 N. Y. Supp. 162, reversed
in the Court of Appeals (189o), 121 N. Y. 199, the question
as to the libelous character of such an imputation under-
went a thorough discussion. The libel complained of was an
article published in the Troy Times of September 15, 1882,
written on the occasion of rumors of trouble in the financial
condition of the Manufacturers' National Bank of Troy, of
which the plaintiff was, at the time of the publication, and
for several years prior thereto, had been, teller. These
rumors had caused a run upon the bank, and the chief
motive of the article was to allay public excitement on the
subject The part of the article alleged to be libelous was
as follows:
Several weeks ago it was rumored that Amasa Moore, the teller of the
bank, had tendered his resignation. Rumors at once began to circulate.
A reporter inquired of Cashier Wellington if it was true that the teller
had resigned, and received in reply the answer that Mr. Moore was on
his vacation. More than this the cashier would not say. A rumor was
circulated that Mr. Moore was suffering from overwork, and that his
mental condition was not entirely good. Next came reports that Cashier
%Vellington was financially involved, and that the bank was in trouble. A
Times reporter at once sought an interview with President Weed of the
bank, and found him and Directors Morrison, Cowee, Bardwell and
others in consultation. They said that the bank was entirely sound,
with a clear surplus of $ioo,ooo; that there had been a little trouble in its
affairs, occasioned by the mental derangement of Teller Moore, and that
the latter's statements, when he was probably not responsible for what he
said, had caused some bad rumors.
On the trial of the case, the Judge refused to charge tle
jury that this article was per se libelous; but left the ques-
tion to their decision, under instructions. The jury found
for the defendants, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial.
This was refused, and he then appealed to the Supreme
Court, which sustained the rulings of the Court below in a
somewhat elaborate and lengthy opinion, which closely fol-
lows the line of reasoning adopted in Mayrani v. Richard-
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sonz (sz qira, page 391), as the following extracts from the
opinion of LEARNED, P. J., will show:
It is possible that, in modern times, when the subject of mental de-
langement has been more thoroughly studied and understood, language
imputing it may have a different effect on the minds of those who hear it
from what it once had. It would be thought perhaps to be only a state-
ment that the body was disordered, and that such disorder manifested
itself in mental condition ; and to say that a man is in poor health cannot
be libelous as a matter of law. * * In the present article, it is stated
that the plaintiff was suffering from overwork. There is nothing dis-
graceful in that. The connection shows that such overwork was the
alleged cause that his mental condition was not good. Certainly this
would not cause public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. It would cause
sympathy and regret. It could not blacken the plaintiff's reputation.
No offensive words are used. The mental condition of men is generally
not good when they are suffering from overwork. * * It seems to us,
then, that it would have been incorrect to charge that this article was!per
se libelous as a matter of law.
Upon the question whether the imputation so affected the
plaintiff in his profession as to make it actionable, the Court
held:
In the present case, the words do not refer to the plaintiff's skill, or
want of skill as a teller. They have no special reference to his occupa-
tion. If the plaintiff had been a mechanic, and had lost his bodily
strength, that would not have had any special reference to his trade. The
Court, however, charged that if the tendency of the article was to injure
the plaintiff in his profession, it was libelous, thus leaving that question,
as the Court had left the other question, to the jury. It seems to us,
then, that it was not error for the Court to refuse to charge that the pub-
lication was libelous.
In this case, in the Court of Appeals (189o), 121 N. Y.
199, ANDREWS, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court,
discusses at some length the question as to the libelous
character of an imputation of insanity, but without arriving
at any very definite result, except that "the imputation of
insanity in a written or printed publication is a fortiori
libelous where it would constitute slander if the words were
spoken," and "several of the text writers state that to
charge in writing that a man is insane, is libelous ;" but he
clearly shows his own unwillingness to decide the case
upon this basis, and takes the far safer and perfectly accurate
ground that the article affected the plaintiff in his calling:
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The publication now in question is not simply an assertion that the
p-laintiff is or has been affected with "mental derangement," discon-
nected with any special circumstances. The assertion was made to
account for the trouble to which the bank had been subjected by reason
of injurious statements made by the plaintiff while in its employment.
Words, to be actionable on the ground that they affect a man in his trade
or occupation, must, as is said, touch him in such trade or occupation;
that is, they must be shown, directly or by inference, to have been spoken
of him in relation thereto, and to be such as would tend to prejudice him
therein. (Sanderson v. Caldwell, 1871, 45 N. Y. 405, and cases cited.)
'The publication did, we think, touch the plaintiff with respect to his
,occupation as bank teller. It imputed' mental derangement while en-
gaged in his business as teller, which affected him in the discharge of his
duties. The words conveyed no imputation upon the plaintiff's honesty,
fidelity, or general capacity. They attributed to him a misfortune
brought upon him by an overzealous application in his employment.
While the statement was calculated to excite sympathy, and even respect,
for the plaintiff, it nevertheless was calculated, also, to injure him in his
-character and employment as a teller. On common understanding,
mental derangement has usually a much more serious significance than
mere physical disease. There can be no doubt that the imputation of
insanity against a man employed in a position of trust and confidence,
such as that of a bank teller, whether the insanity is temporary or not,
although- accompanied by the explanation that it was induced by over-
work, is calculated to injure and prejudice him in that employment, and
-especially where the statement is added that, in consequence of his con-
duct in that condition, the bank has been involved in trouble. The
directors of a bank would naturally hesitate to employ a person as teller
whose mitid had once given way under stress of similar duties, and run
the risk of a recurrence of the malady. The publication was, we think,
defamatory, in a legal sense, although it imputed no crime, and subjected
the plaintiff to no disgrace, reproach, or obloquy, for the reason that its
tendency was to subject the plaintiff to temporal loss, and deprive him of
those advantages and opportunities as a member of the community which
-are open to those who have both a sound mind and a sound body.
This case, then, does not hold that a mere imputation of
insanity is libelous fier se, but that it is libelous when it af-
fects the person referred to in his profession or business.
These cases, then, are all dependent, in part at least, upon
special circumstances. In Rex v. Harvey, the imputation
was against the King; in Southwick v. Stevens, the whole
article, in which the imputation was contained, was clearly
libelous; in Perkins v. .fitchell, the imputation was that
the plaintiff was a dangerous lunatic; it was made by a phy-
sician, and the question was raised by demurrer, which
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failed to bring the privilege distinctly before the court; in
ofrgan v. Liuzgen, the rule is asserted in a qualified form ;
in Clifford v. Cochrane, and Afoore v. Fri'ncis, the imputa-
tion was of the plaintiff in his profession or business; and in
Mfayrani v. Richardsm and Weldon v. Winslow, the impu-
tation was held not actionable, in the first case because it was
not considered defamatory, and in the second because, a!-
though made by a physician, it was made under circumn-
stances which gave it a privileged character.
III.
The question of the libelous character of a mere imputa-
tion of insanity is therefore still open. It has already been
seen that, as the Court concedes in Moore v. Francis (I89o),
12i N. Y. 199 , an oral imputation of insanity is not action-
able without special damage. It, then, such an imputation
is not defamatory when made orally, why should it be held
to be so when written or printed? The imputations which
have been held libelous when written, although not action-
able when spoken, are, almost without exception, such as
have a more or less defamatory or opprobrious meaning,.
such as "liar," "rogue," "rascal," "villain": Townshend,
Slander and Libel, §§ i74 and 177. Such words fall directly
within the definitions given of a libel, e. g.:
A publication, to be a libel, must tend to injure the plaintiff's reputa-
tion, and expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule: Armen-
troul v. AMoranda (1847), 8 Blackf. 426.
A publication is a libel which tends to injure one's reputation in the
common estimation of mankind, to throw contumely or reflect shame
and disgrace upon him, or hold him up as an object of hatred, scorn,
ridicule, and contempt, although it imputes no crime liable to be punished
with infamy, or to prejudice him in his employment. So every publica-
tion by writing, printing, or painting, which charges or imputes to any
person that which renders him liable to punishment, or which is calcu-
lated to make him infamous or ridiculous, is Primafacie a libel: x Hilliard
on Torts, 3d ed. (1886), ch. 7, 1.3.
The mere imputation of insanity does not meet the con-
ditions of these definitions. It neither injures the reputa-
tion, nor exposes to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. As was
said in Mayrant v. Richardson: "It might have been calcu-
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lated to excite compassion, but not hatred, ridicule, or con-
tempt," and "the private character has not been attacked,
the moral conduct impeached, nor the sanctuary of domestic
tranquillity violated. There has been no imputation calcu-
lated to render the plaintiff at object of contempt or ridicule,
or to lessen him in the estimation of his fellow citizens."
So in Moore v. Francis (I888), 3 N. Y. Supp. 162, which,
although reversed in the Court of Appeals, is not there
weakened on this point: " Certainly this would not cause
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. It would cause sym-
pathy, and regret. It could not blacken the plaintiff's
reputation." That the imputation of insanity, not qualified
by special circumstances, causes a feeling of compassion,
and not contempt, for the sufferer, is beyond question. The
remark of BITT, M. R., in Weldon v. De Bathe, that "It
is not a true proposition that the natural result of words im-
puting insanity in a wife is to produce ill feeling towards
her by her husband," will apply equally well to all relations
of life and society. This is sufficiently well proved by
common experience, by the notices of those so afflicted
which are published in the newspapers, for example. Such
notices rarely breathe anything but sympathy. It is, of
course, easy to add to the mere imputation words which will
lend it a censorious or defamatory color, as in Southwick v.
Stevens and Perkins v. Mitchell; but such cases stand on
their own peculiar state of facts.
This consequence is only natural, in view of the fact that
insanity, as previously stated, is a disease: Mayrant v.
Richardson, Joannes v. Burt, McCullough v. E.Pressmnan's
Ass'n, szfra; Lancaster Co. National Bank v. Moore (1875),
78 Pa. 407. But it is not a disease the imputation of which
is per se libelous: Joannes v. Burt, subzra. On the contrary,
it is held to be actus Dei: Scully v. Kirkfiatrick (1875), 79
Pa. 324, and is a misfortune, not a fault: Mayrant v. Rich-
ardson, szora. The tendency of all diseases, except those
which impute moral turpitude, is to awaken compassion for
the sufferer, and insanity is not an exception. It is true that
in Moore v. Francis, in the Court of Appeals (I89O), 121 N.
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Y. 199, it was said that insanity "has usually a much more
serious significance than mere physical disease;" but the
Court did not attempt to define what that significance is,
and the preponderance of authority is manifestly in favor of
classing it with physical diseases, more serious perhaps, as
affecting the most important part of the physical organiza-
tion, or as smallpox is worse than scarlatina. Many diseases,
as smallpox for instance, render the sufferer far more an ob-
ject of aversion than mere insanity usually does. It would
seem, then, from these considerations, that it is the true rule
that a mere imputation of insanity, "disconiected with any
special circumstances," is not within the definition or de-
scription of a libel, and is therefore not fer se actionable,
even when written or printed; that, in short, the same rule
applies to a written or printed, as to an oral imputation of
insanity, as far as thetriniafaie character of it is concerned:
that is, to be actionable, it must be connected with other
circumstances, either special damage, or the profession or
business of the plaintiff, or, as in the case of a physician, be
made by one whose profession lends peculiar weight to the
imputation-which perhaps belongs properly to the head of
special damage.
IV.
It remains, then, to consider how far an imputation of
insanity is actionable as affecting the plaintiff in his profes-
sion or business; for if such an imputation cause special
damage, it is, of course, actionable. The question here is,
whether such an imputation is of such a nature as to affect
the plaintiff in his profession or business, no matter how
made, or whether it must be made of him directly in regard
to that business. The general rule laid down by Town-
shend, § 182, is that "subject only to the conditions (i) that
the occupation is one in which a person may lawfully be
engaged (§ 183), and (2) that it is an occupation which does
or reasonably may yield, or may be expected to yield, pieac-
niary reward, there is no employment-call it business,
trade, profession or office, or what you will-so humble nor
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so exalted but that language which concerns the person in
such his employment will be actionable, if it affects. him-
therein in a manner that may, as a necessary consequence, or
does as a natural or proximate consequence, prevent him
deriving therefrom that pecuniary reward which probably
he might otherwise have obtained."
To be actionable, however, language need not be directly
applicable to the plaintiff in his business; it is sufficient if
it naturally result in injury to him therein: e. g., words im-
puting a want of credit to one engaged in a business, to the
successful prosecution of which credit is essential: Town-
shend, § 191; or imputing ignorance or incapacity to one
engaged in a profession requiring knowledge and skill: Id.
§ 193. Does the imputation of insanity convey such an
imputatiQn of incapacity, or is it in other respects so injuri-
ous, when made in general terms, as to naturally and neces-
sarily result in injury to one engaged in a profession or busi-
ness ?
It is clear at the outset that there are some professions
which demand such skill and knowledge on the part of those
engaged in them that an imputation of insanity is fatal to
success therein. This is especially true of the learned pro-
fessions, and most, if not all, scientific professions. It is
true, also, of occupations where peculiar trust and confidence
are reposed upon those engaged in them. It is possible,
then, that Clifford v. Coclrane and Moore v. Frauds, sufira,
might have been decided upon this ground, even if the im-
putations in those cases had not been directly of the plain-
tiffs in their occupations. This too, would seem to be the
true ground of the ruling in Morgan v. Lingen, sfirra. But
it is sufficient to say that this point has never, except in the
last named case, directly come up for decision; and a vast
class of cases lie outside of these professions, to which this
discussion does not apply. There is no reported case where
the imputation of insanity, cast upon a man in one of the
ordinary occupations of life, has been held to so affect him in
his business, as to be actionable. Nor does there seem to be
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good reason why it should. The mere imputation of insan-
ity does not expose a man to contempt and aversion among
his friends, and therefore it does not follow that lie will lose
his established trade because of such an imputation; and the
loss of speculative profits is too uncertain to sustain the ac-
tion unless they be actually shown to have been caused,
which reduces it to a case of special damage. Such an im-
putation, moreover, conveys no such necessary idea of in-
capacity in any particular business as will necessarily deter
men from dealing with the plaintiff By far the greater
portion of insane persons are only partially'so; and a great
many are fully able to, and do, carry on business successfully.
And wills made by such persons are valid, unless their in-
sanity be shown to have influenced them in the disposal of
their property.
It is true that such persons are not ordinarily regarded as
insane. They are said to be subject to insane delusions.
But it is submitted that there is no real difference between
the cases, as far as capacity is concerned, and that if capacity
exists in the case of a person who is said to have "insane de-
lusions" only, it cannot be properly presumed not to exist
when a person is called "insane" or crazy. Further, many
diseases incapacitate a person for carrying on his business
quite as much as, or even more than, insanity. An attack
of fever, or a broken arm, incapacitates a mechanic most
effectually from carrying on his trade. Yet it would hardly
be urged that such an imputation, falsely made, would be
actionable on the ground of imputing incapacity to the
plaintiff. It seems, therefore, to be safer not to state the
rule too broadly, but to limit the cases in which an imputa-
tion of insanity is actionable as affecting a man in his pro-
fession or business, to those cases in which the imputation
directly refers, either by words or circumstances; to that
profession or business, or those in which it is the natural and
necessary result of such an imputation to cause injury to
those engaged in particular professions or occupations, al-
though there be no reference to such occupations.
ACTIONABLE IMPUTATION OF INSANITY.
V.
There remains the question, raised and decided in some of
the cases, how far such an imputation can be considered
privileged. In the first place, it was expressly ruled in
Wedon v. Winslow, szura, and very clearly intimated in
Perkins v. fitchelil, supra, that the imputation of insanity,
regularly made in the course of a proceeding under the
Lunacy Acts of a commonwealth, is privileged; and in
Mayrant v. Richardson, although the very broad language
of the Court seems to be opposed to holding such an impu-
tation libelous in any case, the basis of the decision seeihs
to be, that such an imputation, made bonafide, of a person
who for the time being wears a public character, or occupies
a position which makes him and his qualifications or char-
acteristics a subject of public interest, is privileged because
of that public interest. It may be argued, also, that when-
ever such an imputation is of a person or concerning a mat-
ter which is of general interest to the public, though not
strictly public or of public concern, the privilege will attach,
the person or his occupation being held to hold a quasi-
public character. This has been decided in cases of a simi-
lar nature, such as that of an important surgical case, Gun-
ning v. Ap1 lelon (i88O), 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 471, and that
of a teacher of shorthand, Press Co. v. Stewart (1888), i9
Pa. 584, and there would seem to be no good reason why
the privilege should not extend to all cases where the plain-
tiff possesses a quasz-public character; but no decided case
has ruled as yet that an imputation of insanity, otherwise
actionable, would be privileged under such circumstances.
VI.
The subject maybe summarized as follows: (i.) An oral
imputation of insanity is not actionable, unless it cause
special damage, or be of and concerning one in the way of
his profession or business. Presumably, though it has not
been so decided, the imputation must either be directly con-
nected with that business, or the business be of such a nature
"that such an imputation will naturally and necessarily injure
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the plaintiff therein. (2.) A written or printed imputation
of insanity has not been decided to be libelous, except in
cases where it was clearly defamatory, or affected a person in
the way of his profession or business, or was made by a phy-
sician; and presumably such an imputation would not be
held libelous in other cases. (3.) Even when firima ace
libelous, the imputation of insanity may be shown to be
privileged: either on account of the public character of the
individual referred to, and the general interest which the
public has in his qualifications, actions, or welfare; or on
account of having been properly made in the course of a
regular judicial proceeding, legally instituted under the
Lunacy Acts of the commonwealth.
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REGISTER 233, divides slander into five classes, as a summary of the com-
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ally upon the question of freedom of the press. The case arose from a
publication in The San Antonto Express, of the statement that the de-
fendant had retained the balance of an estate as administrator, subject to
the order of the heirs, and that the heirs were afraid to give any instruc-
tions from fear of the expenses eating up the estate, with a conclusion
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others, when a person is a candidate for mayor.
The Law of Slander as applicable to physicians, is the subject of a
leading article in 19 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER 465, where the writer
examines the extent to which a physician can be charged with miscon-
duct without having a cause of action therefor. The article presents the
converse of the power discussed in the preceding leading article, and
shows it is a safe thing for an irate parent to denounce his physician in
general terms applicable to his own case alone. This is partially founded
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